A Service-Oriented Adaptive Hierarchical Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning

摘要

Recently, federated learning (FL) has emerged as a novel framework for distributed model training. In FL, the task publisher (TP) releases tasks, and local model owners (LMOs) use their local data to train models. Sometimes, FL suffers from the lack of training data, and thus workers are recruited for gathering data. To this end, this paper proposes an adaptive incentive mechanism from a service-oriented perspective, with the objective of maximizing the utilities of TP, LMOs and workers. Specifically, a Stackelberg game is theoretically established between the LMOs and TP, positioning TP as the leader and the LMOs as followers. An analytical Nash equilibrium solution is derived to maximize their utilities. The interaction between LMOs and workers is formulated by a multi-agent Markov decision process (MAMDP), with the optimal strategy identified via deep reinforcement learning (DRL). Additionally, an Adaptively Searching the Optimal Strategy Algorithm (ASOSA) is designed to stabilize the strategies of each participant and solve the coupling problems. Extensive numerical experiments are conducted to validate the efficacy of the proposed method.