Justin Sytsma

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About

Justin Sytsma is a leading figure in experimental philosophy of mind, whose work rigorously tests how ordinary people conceptualize consciousness, subjective experience, and mental states. His research bridges philosophy and cognitive science, using empirical methods to challenge or refine philosophical intuitions about the mind. A major contribution is his investigation of how people attribute feelings and experiences to non-human entities—such as robots and corporations—revealing that folk psychology often diverges sharply from philosophical theories like Nagel’s “what it’s like” criterion. His widely cited chapter, “The Robots of the Dawn of Experimental Philosophy of Mind” (2014, 11 citations), critically examines automatic agency-detection hypotheses, while his earlier paper “Robot pains and corporate feelings” (2011, 8 citations) demonstrates that laypeople do not consistently associate subjective experience with phenomenal consciousness. Sytsma also addresses foundational debates, as in “Experiencers and the Ambiguity Objection” (2018), defending the pretheoretical reality of phenomenal consciousness against skeptical challenges. His work has shaped how experimental philosophers approach the mind-body problem, offering a data-driven perspective that challenges armchair assumptions and informs ongoing discussions about artificial intelligence, moral status, and the nature of consciousness.