The mimetic origins of self-consciousness in phylo-, onto- and robotogenesis

Abstract

The paper presents and defends the mimetic hypothesis concerning the origin of self-consciousness in three different kinds of development: hominid evolution, the mind of the child, and the epigenesis of mind within an artificial autonomous system - a robot. The proposed crucial factor for the emergence of self-consciousness is the ability to map between one's own subjective body-image and those of others, supported by a partially innate 'mirror system'. Combined with social interaction, this gives rise to inter-subjectivity and starts a developmental cycle of: 1) increased objectification of one's body-image, 2) increased volitional control, 3) increased understanding of the intentionality of others, and 4) increased understanding of one's own intentionality. The hypothesis has far reaching theoretical implications: the self-consciousness and empathy are co-determined; the language and tool-use are not causes, but rather consequences of increased self-consciousness; and most of the symptoms of autism can be accounted for as resulting from an impairment of the mirror system. The implications are negative for non-representational approaches to robotics and in favor of approaches based on imitation/mimesis.