The obligation to exercise discretion in warfare: why autonomous weapons systems are unlawful

Abstract

The question of ‘killer robots’, or autonomous weapons systems (AWS), has garnered much attention in recent discourse. While officials often downplay the prospect of such systems making targeting and other crucial decisions, their own statements reveal the possibility that such capabilities would be developed in the near future. For instance, in late 2012, the US Department of Defense (DoD) imposed a de facto moratorium on the development of fully autonomous weapons systems, by emphasizing that weapons ‘shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force’. From the mere fact that the DoD felt the need to constrain the development and use of AWS for the time being and in several ways, we can learn that the prospect of such weapons is realistic. Indeed, DoD Directive 3000.09 includes a bypass clause in which deviations from its requirements can be approved by high-ranking officials through special procedures. There is therefore a consensus, among commentators, that the motivation to develop and deploy AWS will eventually overcome these temporary constraints. This makes the discussion of AWS a timely one.