Driver-Pedestrian Interactions at Unsignalized Crossings Are Not in Line With the Nash Equilibrium

摘要

Recent developments in vehicle automation require simulations of human-robot interactions in the road traffic context, which can be achieved by computational models of human behavior such as game theory. Game theory provides a good insight into road user behavior by considering agents’ interdependencies. However, it is still unclear whether conventional game theory is suitable for modeling vehicle-pedestrian interactions at unsignalized locations or if more complex models like behavioral game theory are needed. Hence, we compared four game-theoretic models based on two different payoff formulations and two solving algorithms, to answer this question. Unlike the most previous studies that employed naturalistic datasets to test and validate such models, this study utilized a distributed simulation dataset to test and compare the models. The study was conducted by connecting a CAVE-based pedestrian simulator to a motion-based driving simulator to replicate the traffic scenarios for 32 pedestrian-driver pairs. The findings demonstrated that there is a high variability between participant pairs’ behaviors. Our proposed behavioral game-theoretic model outperformed other models in predicting the interaction outcome. This translates to a decrease by 70% and 67% in the root mean squared error (RMSE) when compared to the baseline model, for marked and unmarked crossings, respectively. The model can also predict which interaction will take the longest time to resolve. According to our results, road users cannot be expected to behave in line with the Nash equilibrium of conventional game theory that underscores the complexity of human behavior with implications for the testing and development of automated vehicles.