When Is a Robot a Moral Agent?

Abstract

The author argues that in certain circumstances robots can be seen as real moral agents. A distinction is
\nmade between persons and moral agents such that, it is not necessary for a robot to have personhood in
\norder to be a moral agent. I detail three requirements for a robot to be seen as a moral agent. The first is
\nachieved when the robot is significantly autonomous from any programmers or operators of the machine.
\nThe second is when one can analyze or explain the robot???s behavior only by ascribing to it some predisposition
\nor ???intention??? to do good or harm. And finally, robot moral agency requires the robot to behave in a way
\nthat shows and understanding of responsibility to some other moral agent. Robots with all of these criteria
\nwill have moral rights as well as responsibilities regardless of their status as persons.