首页 /研究 /An inexact-penalty method for GNE seeking in games with dynamic agents
OTHER

An inexact-penalty method for GNE seeking in games with dynamic agents

Andrew R. Romano, Lacra Pavel

发表年份
2021
引用次数
3
访问权限
开放获取

摘要

We consider a network of autonomous agents whose outputs are actions in a game with coupled constraints. In such network scenarios, agents seeking to minimize coupled cost functions using distributed information while satisfying the coupled constraints. Current methods consider the small class of multi-integrator agents using primal-dual methods. These methods can only ensure constraint satisfaction in steady-state. In contrast, we propose an inexact penalty method using a barrier function for nonlinear agents with equilibrium-independent passive dynamics. We show that these dynamics converge to an epsilon-GNE while satisfying the constraints for all time, not only in steady-state. We develop these dynamics in both the full-information and partial-information settings. In the partial-information setting, dynamic estimates of the others' actions are used to make decisions and are updated through local communication. Applications to optical networks and velocity synchronization of flexible robots are provided.

关键词

Computer scienceConstraint (computer-aided design)Mathematical optimizationPenalty methodDual (grammatical number)Synchronization (alternating current)Nonlinear systemDouble integratorState (computer science)Function (biology)

相关论文

查看 OTHER 分类全部论文