Resilient Control of Switched Vehicle Platoons under False Data Injection Attacks

Abstract

This paper investigates resilient control design for leader--follower vehicle platoons with mode-dependent powertrain dynamics subject to False Data Injection (FDI) attacks on vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication channels. The longitudinal motion of each vehicle is described by a switched third-order model that captures changes in the powertrain dynamics across different operating modes. To estimate the attack signals that are injected into the communication channels, each vehicle is equipped with an auxiliary system, and a dedicated observer is implemented for each communication link. The resulting attack estimates are then used to mitigate the effects of the attacks through our proposed resilient controller. For attacks with bounded rates but potentially unbounded amplitudes, the closed-loop platoon is shown to be uniformly ultimately bounded. For a predecessor-following topology, string stability is established for the nominal switched platoon, while the effect of nonzero attack-estimation errors on acceleration propagation is shown to be bounded. Numerical case studies demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.