Node-Wise Dynamic Optimal Control for Evolutionary Games on General Multilayer Networks

Abstract

Promoting cooperative behaviour amongst decision makers has key implications for the long term sustainability of social systems. Incentives can promote cooperation in situations where defection is more favourable. Previous research has identified optimal decentralised incentives in structured populations where the social environment is described by a generic single-layer networks. Optimality is here intended in the sense of cost minimisation. Here, we provide and optimal incentive strategy for structured populations in general network, a rather unexplored case. Further, we look at populations where, through the network structure, each player interact with one set of neighbours while contributing to an opinion diffusion dynamics from a second set of neighbours. Hence we cover the case of multilayer networks. To fill this gap, we provide a solution to the optimal control problem by solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and derive an analytic solution for distributing incentives in multilayer networks. By implementing the dynamics of the networked Prisoner's Dilemma Game, we provide a feedback control loop that yields an optimal incentive distribution over time. The dynamic incentive depends on the current state of cooperation, the game-layer network, the strategy-diffusion layer, and the payoff matrix design. We found that the optimal incentive is node-wise, unique to each node on the network, influenced by its relative position according to the adjacency matrices of both layers. We also found that the optimal solution is not exclusively reward or punishment. While one node can receive a reward, the other node may receive punishment at the same time, depending on its current level of cooperation, relative to other nodes. We provide analytic solutions and numerical validations for the cases studied, comparing our results to the existing literature.