Information Design under Uncertain Utilities: Probabilistic and CVaR Approaches

Abstract

This paper studies information design when the designer lacks precise knowledge of agents' payoff coefficients. The Calibrated Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (Cal-BCE) is introduced as a solution concept that augments the Bayes correlated equilibrium with a corrector policy preserving incentive compatibility under the designer's structural uncertainty, adapting its revelation principle to this setting. The design problem is nonconvex in general, but under a linear-quadratic-Gaussian structure it admits convex second-order cone and semidefinite reformulations under two-sided probabilistic and conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) constraints, with feasibility guaranteed by a Hadamard invertibility condition. A joint decentralization theorem shows that both designs cap cross-agent action covariances, the CVaR design more tightly at a common tolerance; but because the formulations operate at design-specific feasibility thresholds, the realized ordering is calibration-dependent. Experiments on fifteen sector ETFs confirm the trade-off: the probabilistic design attains higher mean welfare and the CVaR design better tail protection, with neither dominating outright.