Secure Navigation of Robots in Adversarial Environments

Abstract

We study the problem of navigating a robot in an adversarial environment, where the objective is to perform localization and trajectory planning despite the malicious and unknown action of an attacker. We consider robots with single integrator dynamics, equipped with a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) sensor and a Radio Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) sensor that provides relative positioning information with respect to a group of radio stations, each with limited communication range. The attacker can simultaneously spoof the sensor readings and send falsified control inputs to the robot, so as to deviate its trajectory from the nominal path. We demonstrate the existence of attacks that escape detectability, and illustrate a method for their systematic design. Conversely, we show that appropriate control design and waypoints selection allow the trajectory planner to ensure attack detectability or secure navigation. More generally, our results show that trajectory planning in nominal and adversarial settings are substantially different, and that careful trajectory design is required to ensure resilience to attacks.