Deception and Counter Deception in Adversarial Graph Traversal Game

Abstract

We study deception in adversarial graph traversal, where a mobile agent seeks to reach a goal with minimum cost while an adversary alters edge costs to increase the total traversal cost. Unlike prior works that assume fixed observer-deceiver roles, we model this problem with two-sided incomplete information in which both players possess private information and update beliefs from observed actions. To solve the resulting indefinite-horizon game, we develop an adaptation of the Extensive-Form Double Oracle (XDO) algorithm. While the standard XDO algorithm is designed for finite games, the proposed adaptation ensures bounded computation despite endogenous game termination. We show that the proposed algorithm terminates in finite time and returns an epsilon-Nash equilibrium. Finally, we use Value of Information to characterize the deceptive and counter-deceptive behaviors that emerge from equilibrium strategies.