Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing it Would Require Making it More Heideggerian

摘要

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgments This review essay is a revised version of my Barwise Prize talk delivered at the 2006 Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, which will be published by MIT Press in Philip Husbands, Owen Holland and Michael Wheeler (Eds.), The Mechanisation of Mind in History (Forthcoming, title to be confirmed). Notes Notes 1. Roger Schank proposed what he called "scripts." He tells us: "A script is a structure that describes appropriate sequences of events in a particular context. A script is made up of slots and requirements about what can fill those slots. The structure is an interconnected whole, and what is in one slot affects what can be in another. A script is a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions that defines a well-known situation" (Schank & Abelson, Citation1977, p. 41; as cited in Preston & Bishop, Citation2002, p. 17). 2. Although you couldn't tell it from the Cog web page: http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/humanoid-robotics-group/cog/cog.html 3. Heidegger himself is unclear about the status of the ready-to-hand. When he is stressing the holism of equipmental relations, he thinks of the ready-to-hand as equipment, and of equipment as things like lamps, tables, doors, and rooms that have a place in a whole nexus of other equipment. Furthermore, he holds that breakdown reveals that these interdefined pieces of equipment are made of present-at-hand stuff that was there all along (1962, p. 97). At one point Heidegger even goes so far as to include the ready-to-hand under the same categories that characterize the present-at-hand: "We call 'categories'—characteristics of being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein. … Any entity is either a 'who' (existence) or a what (present-at-hand in the broadest sense)" (p. 71, italics added). 4. Merleau-Ponty (Citation1962) says the same: "[T]o move one's body is to aim at things through it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call, which is made upon it independently of any representation" (p. 139). 5. According to Heidegger, intentional content isn't in the mind, nor in some third realm (as it is for Husserl), nor in the world; it isn't anywhere. It's a way of being-towards. 6. It's important to realize that when he introduces the term 'understanding', Heidegger (Citation1982, p. 276) explains that he means a kind of know-how. 7. This way of putting the source of significance covers both animals and people. By the time he published Being and Time, however, Heidegger was interested exclusively in the special kind of significance found in the world opened up by human beings who are defined by the stand they take on their own being. We might call this meaning. In this paper I'm putting the question of uniquely human meaning aside to concentrate on the sort of significance we share with animals. 8. I'm over simplifying here. Wheeler does note that Heidegger has an account of online, involved problem solving that Heidegger calls dealing with the "un-ready-to-hand." But while for Heidegger and for Wheeler coping at its best deals directly with the ready-to-hand with no place for representations of any sort, for Heidegger but not for Wheeler all un-ready-to-hand coping takes place on the background of an even more basic nonrepresentational holistic coping which allows copers to orient themselves in the world. As we shall see, it is this basic coping, not any kind of problem solving, agential or subagential, that enables Heideggerian AI to avoid the frame problem. 9. Just how Hebbian learning is translated into an attractor is not something Freeman claims to know in detail. He simply notes: "The attractors are not shaped by the stimuli directly, but by previous experience with those stimuli … and neuromodulators as well as sensory input. Together these modify the synaptic connectivity within the neuropil and thereby also the attractor landscape" (2000, p. 62). 10. Quotations f