Wardropian Cycles make traffic assignment both optimal and fair by eliminating price-of-anarchy with Cyclical User Equilibrium for compliant connected autonomous vehicles

摘要

Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) open the possibility for centralised routing with full compliance, making System Optimal traffic assignment attainable. However, as System Optimum makes some drivers better off than others, voluntary acceptance seems dubious. To overcome this issue, we propose a new concept of Wardropian cycles, which, in contrast to previous utopian visions, makes the assignment fair on top of being optimal, which amounts to satisfaction of both Wardrop's principles. Such cycles, represented as sequences of permutations to the daily assignment matrices, always exist and equalise, after a limited number of days, average travel times among travellers (like in User Equilibrium) while preserving everyday optimality of path flows (like in System Optimum). We propose exact methods to compute such cycles and reduce their length and within-cycle inconvenience to the users. As identification of optimal cycles turns out to be NP-hard in many aspects, we introduce a greedy heuristic efficiently approximating the optimal solution. Finally, we introduce and discuss a new paradigm of Cyclical User Equilibrium, which ensures stability of optimal Wardropian Cycles under unilateral deviations. We complement our theoretical study with large-scale simulations. In Barcelona, 670 vehicle-hours of Price-of-Anarchy are eliminated using cycles with a median length of 11 days-though 5% of cycles exceed 90 days. However, in Berlin, just five days of applying the greedy assignment rule significantly reduces initial inequity. In Barcelona, Anaheim, and Sioux Falls, less than 7% of the initial inequity remains after 10 days, demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach in improving traffic performance with more ubiquitous social acceptability.