ShieldMMU: Detecting and Defending against Controlled-Channel Attacks in Shielding Memory System

摘要

Intel SGX and hypervisors isolate non-privileged programs from other software, ensuring confidentiality and integrity. However, side-channel attacks continue to threaten Intel SGX's security, enabling malicious OS to manipulate PTE present bits, induce page faults, and steal memory access traces. Despite extensive research, existing defenses focus on detection or rely on impractical solutions. This paper presents ShieldMMU, a comprehensive solution for mitigating controlled channel attacks, balancing compatibility, performance, and usability. Leveraging a Merkle Tree-inspired Defense Tree (DD-Tree), ShieldMMU protects PTE integrity by detecting, locating, and restoring attacked PTEs. It identifies MMU page table lookup events and side-channel attacks, promptly restoring PTE parameters to prevent page fault traps and ensure secure non-privileged application operation within SGX. Our experiments confirm ShieldMMU's enhanced security and acceptable latency performance.